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## The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00250-84 12 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Charles E. Waterman

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David D. Gries

National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

SUBJECT : Meeting with Admiral Murphy

The purpose of the meeting was to cast CIA and Intelligence Community efforts on narcotics in a more positive light. I explained that we were almost ready to begin disseminating sanitized strategic and tactical reports to Miami, needing only a green light from Justice on some legal issues. Justice is expected to make a decision by 26 January. An Office of Security-PCS-IAD team plans to visit Miami early next week to make certain that our product will be handled in proper fashion. Murphy seemed pleased to hear this. (Now we must make it happen.)

But Murphy had something else on his mind. He raised again the subject of why CIA could not assign a senior staff officer to the National Narcotics Border Interdiction Service (NNBIS) staff located in his office. Most other agencies in the narcotics field, including NSA, have been willing to do this. Why was CIA reluctant? I responded that we had reservations about the intermingling of CIA and NNBIS Center personnel, either at the six Centers or in the Vice President's Office: the Centers were engaged in law enforcement, while CIA was prohibited from becoming involved in active law enforcement cases. We could supply advice and expertise to law enforcement from our Headquarters more efficiently than from the field.

Unfortunately, there are counter-arguments for each of these points, and Murphy made good use of them. His principal point was that although our arguments made sense with respect to placing CIA people in the Centers, they are less compelling regarding putting an officer in his office, since the Center staff in his office has no law enforcement powers, does not involve itself in ongoing cases, and for the most part is unaware of what cases are coming up. He asked me to raise it again with you, and I said I would, but was doubtful of a favorable outcome, in part because of legal issues. There was a certain amount of joshing back and forth, but the message was that he was not going to stop asking, no matter what our answer.

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I also took a few moments to show him what the DDI/OGI had produced in 1983 -- about one and a half inches of generally high quality narcotics analysis. After the meeting, Murphy called Sporkin -- but didn't reach him -- probably to review legal issues.

<u>Comment</u>: We will have to make a decision. Murphy not only wants a CIA staff officer assigned to his office to run the intelligence component of the Center headquarters, but he also wants a senior experienced CIA officer for this job. By this he means a man who can ride herd over other agencies in the Intelligence Community and force them to share intelligence with his Centers and to help the Centers process it. This is a tall order. Can we meet, including Stan Sporkin, to make a decision?

David D. Gries

cc:	Sporkin	

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NIC #00250-84
12 January 1984
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 -
1 - EX REG 1 - EXDIR
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1 - VC/NIC (WATERMAN)
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